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Richard M. Bird* and J. Scott Wilkie**
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** Ernst & Young LLP, Toronto

Abstract
This paper is a non-technical discussion by an economist and lawyer, each with long
international experience in taxation, of the constraints and objectives that in principle and
practice shape tax policy design. After discussing the main factors traditionally taken
into account by those charged with designing tax policy in any country – such as revenue,
the costs of taxation, equity and fairness, administrability, and the effects of taxation on
growth and other non-fiscal objectives – several additional important considerations
associated with ‘globalization’ are then discussed with special attention to income taxes.
The paper concludes with a brief reflection on how the ‘new world tax order’ in which
countries must now develop their tax systems may perhaps develop over time.
Key words: tax policy design; globalization
JEL codes: H20, K34
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A slightly different version of this paper, with even more of a Canadian focus, appears as Chapter 2 in
Kerr, McKenzie and Mintz 2012). In view of the mixed and relatively general nature of the audience of the
original paper, we have endeavoured to keep both the economic and the legal technicalities as well as the
references to a minimum.
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Why do we have taxes? No one likes taxes. People do not like to pay them.
Governments do not like to impose them. To spend, however, countries must tax. If they
do not tax the long run consequences are likely to be even less welcome than taxation.2
Taxes are necessary both to finance desired public spending and to ensure that the burden
of paying for such spending is distributed in a way that is administratively feasible,
economically sustainable and politically acceptable. Every country must thus have a tax
system.3 But what tax system is best for any particular country at any particular time?
The answer depends to a considerable extent on how much governments spend and what
they spent it on. Of course, governments are really “us” – the community or country -- in
a different guise so that when governments spend they are spending our collective
resources and we, the citizens are spending together, collectively. To put it another way,
citizens through their political institutions may choose to consume collectively in the
same way as households allocate the family budget. Just as in a family, of course, not all
are income earners, so we may choose to share – redistribute – some of our collective
revenues to ensure that those with no or smaller incomes are not excluded from such
publicly-provided goods as education or health or to supplement their ability to obtain
such privately-provided goods as food or shelter. Moreover, we may as a community also
use the tax system to alter the risks and rewards associated with various choices that we
as individuals may make with respect to how we spend our private incomes.
The larger the public sector, the more important it is to have as efficient, equitable and
administrable a tax system as possible. What constitutes a good and feasible tax system
for any country at any time depends on a host of primary social, political and economic
considerations and choices. This paper considers both the objectives that a good tax
system may attempt to achieve and some criteria that may guide not only the initial
design and implementation of taxes but also subsequent adaptations to changes in
domestic and international circumstances that may make the tax system less effective in
achieving its objectives.
The nature of a country’s tax system inevitably reflects both the relative weights that
society through its political institutions decides to place on different objectives and the
extent to which tax instruments are explicitly or implicitly intended to achieve those
objectives. As an eminent American jurist (Oliver Wendell Holmes) once said, taxes are
the price we pay for civilization. It is not surprising, then, that many of the criteria
commonly associated with identifying and devising good tax policy reflect notions of
“fairness” -- sometimes considered the glue of a democratic society -- in the distribution
of tax responsibilities. The collective consumption effected through taxation both
facilitates civil society and establishes its boundaries. Private opportunities for benefit
and gain to a substantial extent depend on the existence of a civil society that permits and
encourages people to be engaged, safely, in a variety of social, political and economic
2

Countries can always print money to pay for public expenditures – the contemporary term is “quantitative
easing”. But excessive or unnecessary recourse to this practice results in inflation which in itself in effect
imposes an arbitrary, distorting and often highly unfair ‘tax’ on people. Formal taxes are a fairer and more
efficient way to take purchasing power from people than inflating the currency.
3
This paper does not consider the many factors that determine the appropriate (or actual) level of taxation
at any particular time in any particular country but instead focuses on the question of how best to achieve
any given level of taxation
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relations. A sustainable well-functioning modern society requires a population that is
both physically and intellectually well-nourished. In the modern world, private and
material economic success thus needs and depends on good legal, medical, education and
public safety systems. Since we all benefit from such systems presumably “fairness”
demands that we should all to some extent contribute to their support. But what is a fair
way to do so?
Two distinct fairness ‘principles’ are commonly employed to assess tax policies. One is
the ability to pay principle -- that those who can pay more should pay more. The other is
the benefit principle -- that those who benefit most should contribute most. Although
good arguments can be made in terms of both equity and efficiency that the benefit
principle should be applied whenever possible, it cannot easily be applied to financing
most of the expenditures of governments. It is thus some version of the ability principle,
broadly conceived, that most consider relevant when it comes to the design of such
broad-based taxes as income and sales taxes.
Whatever one thinks of redistributive taxation, common sense – as well as good
economics -- suggests both that the ‘price’ of taxation – the costs of the tax system -should be kept to a minimum. In order to achieve this goal the tax system must work
properly in the sense that the taxes imposed can actually be collected in an observably
accurate and accountable way. A second requirement is that people should be as fully
aware as possible of what they are paying -- and of what they are getting in terms of both
direct personal benefits as well as from more general collective consumption decisions
including those that use the tax system to encourage and discourage certain activities.
Section 1 focuses on such key policy objectives of taxation as revenue generation and
distribution and the achievement of non-fiscal policy objectives (such as economic
growth and industrial policy). This section also discusses the traditional trinity of tax
policy criteria -- equity, efficiency, and administrability. Equity, for example, is often
divided into two subcategories – horizontal equity (the principle that those who are equal
should be treated equally by the tax system) and the related but distinct concept of
vertical equity (the principle that those who are unequal with respect to some relevant
characteristic such as income or disability should be treated appropriately unequally by
the tax system). Both aspects of equity may or may not be included in the more general
notion of "fairness" mentioned earlier.
As the priority many attach to equity issues in appraising tax policy suggests, tax policy
is by no means just about economics. Inevitably, it also reflects political factors,
including concerns about fairness in the sense of the distribution of income, wealth and
consumption. Taxes may affect distribution through changing economic incentives as
well as by being more or less progressive, that is, increasing more than proportionately
with respect to the amount of income accruing to particular individuals or families –
assuming that is the basis on which comparisons are made.4 In addition to affecting the
distribution of income, wealth, and consumption, taxes almost always impose real costs
4

At a deeper level, as the new fiscal sociology suggests, the perceived fairness of the tax system may also
play a critical role in ensuring the long-run sustainability of political and state institutions. However, we do
not pursue this point further here.
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on society. These costs include not only the obvious administrative costs shown in
government budgets but also the less obvious compliance costs imposed on taxpayers
and, even more importantly, the equally real, but invisible, efficiency costs that are
imposed on society as a whole when economic decisions are altered as a result of
taxation. Broadly understood, an efficient tax policy is one that keeps these costs to a
minimum while achieving other tax policy objectives to the extent possible. Finally,
regardless of the objectives or goals that any country may wish to accomplish through tax
policy, in practice what tax policy accomplishes depends on whether it is administered
effectively. Administrability, like efficiency and equity, is thus invariably a key criterion
that needs to be considered in designing and evaluating tax systems. All this is discussed
further in Section 1.
However, the discussion in Section 1 does not go as far as is necessary to cope with some
latent, but increasingly evident, forces that now impinge on tax systems everywhere. For
the most part, Section 1 follows the traditional path of implicitly assuming that a country
can exist in isolation from the rest of the world. In reality, none has and none ever will.
Good tax policy must therefore take explicitly into account the international setting.
Countries cannot, and should not, consider and pursue policy objectives and decisions in
isolation. The new demands made on tax policy by international factors imply that the
framework for guiding tax policy analysis may need renovation as discussed in Section 2
of this chapter. Though much of the contemporary discussion about the need to take
international factors explicitly into consideration in designing and developing tax policy
has focused on business taxation, the implications are deeper. How businesses (including
the legal fictions called corporations) are taxed affects all citizens in one way or other.
Taxes are, in the end, always and everywhere paid not by legal entities but by people,
whether directly on wages and investment income or explicitly or indirectly on purchases
of goods and services. A well-known comic strip (Pogo) once said: “We have seen the
enemy and they is us.” We may or may not want to do what others do, but there is no
doubt that our choices must contend with the reality that they have done it, or may do so
soon. Section 2 develops some possible implications for tax policy objectives and design
arising from the need in making national tax policy to accommodate the reality in most
countries of increasing integration into the world.
By reducing the degrees of freedom available to policy designers at the national level,
globalization has in some ways shifted the terms of the national tax policy discussion
closer to the ‘model’ commonly set out for tax policy design at the subnational level. This
is not an unfamiliar situation for those living in federal countries like Canada or the
United States since in such countries tax infrastructure is in some respects an
international tax system in microcosm – a constellation of tax satellites, the provinces or
states (and local governments) operating within the gravitational field of a central tax
sun, the federal regime. The concluding Section 3 therefore considers briefly whether
there are any lessons to be found in subnational experience for national tax policy in an
evolving world of international tax forces, experiences and influences that affect all
countries to varying degrees, but with none being uniquely accountable or in a controlling
position.
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1.

The Traditional Approach

1.1

Introduction

Most discussions of tax policy objectives in any country begin by stating that the
fundamental objective of taxation is to secure the resources needed for public sector
purposes in an equitable, efficient and sustainable fashion and then proceed to set out a
series of criteria that may be used to evaluate the suitability of different tax instruments to
achieve this basic aim. In reality, of course, in the end tax policy is pre-eminently
influenced by political factors (such as the federal nature of a country), but in this section
we follow this general tradition, considering the design of an appropriate tax system
largely in economic and administrative terms (other than the discussion of the critical
equity issue), essentially in isolation from other policies, and largely without paying
attention to the international context.
1.2

Revenue

Reliable Revenue Flows
To begin at the beginning, the most basic and essential characteristic of a good tax system
is that it raises sufficient revenue to fund government operations and programs. The rate
at which revenues increase over time depends on the tax structure, the quality of tax
administration, and the pace and nature of economic growth. The income elasticity of a
tax system measures how fast revenues grow relative to the economy. Tax elasticity is
defined as the percentage change in tax revenues divided by the percentage change in
GDP (or potential tax base, such as personal income). Elasticity equal to one, for
example, means that tax revenues will remain a constant share of GDP. Elasticity greater
than one indicates that tax revenues grow more rapidly than income. In principle, over
time revenues should on average grow at about the same rate as desired expenditures
(that is, the income-elasticity for revenues and expenditures should be the same). As an
example, over the 1970-90 period the buoyancy of general government receipts
(including both taxes and non-tax receipts) in Canada was 1.2, compared to only 0.9 for
the 1990-2008 period; interestingly, since the buoyancy of total government expenditures
was 1.4 in the first period and 0.9 in the second period, the tax system has done a better
job in terms of financing public expenditures in recent years.5
Effects of Tax System Structure
The overall elasticity of any tax system is simply the average of the elasticity of
individual taxes, weighted by the percentage of total taxes raised by the tax. The
elasticity of a tax depends on the specific characteristics of its structure. The elasticity of
personal income taxes generally reflects the progressivity of their rate structure and, most
5

Calculated from data in Department of Finance (2010). Tax “elasticity” refers to revenue growth in the
absence of any tax policy changes, while tax “buoyancy” refers to growth including the effects of such
changes. In principle, elasticity is a better measure of the growth potential of an existing tax structure;
however, buoyancy is both easier to estimate and in some ways more relevant in showing the extent to
which countries finance public expenditures through taxes.
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importantly, the level of the personal exemptions (or zero bracket) relative to average
income levels. Consumption taxes are more elastic if they cover more rapidly growing
goods and services rather than just more slowly growing traditional goods (such as the
traditional ‘excise’ goods of tobacco and alcohol) and if they are levied as a percentage of
the price (like the GST) rather than on the specific quantity purchased (as with most
tobacco and fuel taxes). Property tax revenue increases more rapidly when reappraisals
occur on a regular basis and when property is fully and regularly valued.
Revenue Growth
Revenue growth generally slows during recessions and accelerates during expansions.
Revenue elasticity also tends to rise in expansions and fall in recessions, thus
exacerbating the volatility of revenue flows. The corporate income tax is particularly
volatile because in a recession corporate profits decline more rapidly than overall
economic growth. Countries that depend heavily on taxation of natural resources such as
oil or minerals are especially vulnerable to cyclical swings, with wide swings in
commodity prices changing the level of tax revenues. Generally, a country that relies on
a balanced set of tax instruments rather than a single revenue source will have lower tax
revenue volatility, just as an individual investor can reduce the volatility of her
investment portfolio by adopting a diversified investment strategy.
Of course, there is much more to tax policy than revenue and more to measuring its
significance than such simple analytical parameters as elasticity. One reason this is true
is simply because the economy inevitably extends beyond national borders. For example,
a recent official Canadian report argued that “...the goal for Canada should be to make
this country the location of choice for the higher-value elements of ... global value chains
– whether led by Canadian firms or as part of others’ supply chains – as higher-value
productive activity translates into higher wages and salaries., more occupational choice
and a better quality of life for Canadians” (Government of Canada (2007, 6). What this
means among other things, as the same panel’s final report said, is that “tax policy
involves more than deciding how much revenue must be raised. An equally important
policy issue is the design of a scheme of taxation and its impact on individual and
corporate incentives and behaviour....” (Government of Canada (2008), 62). Of course,
similar concerns are important even in a solely domestic context.
1.3

The Costs of Taxation

Administrative Costs
Taxes are essentially a means of transferring resources from private to public use (or
possibly from self-selected private uses to collective private uses as determined and
organized through public intervention for which tax policy as a tool). Taxation in
principle need not affect the amount of resources available for society’s use, whether for
public or private purposes. However, few if any taxes come free. Most obviously, taxes
cost something to collect. These administrative costs are not excessive in most developed
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countries – in Canada, for example, they are a bit more than 1 percent of tax revenues6 –
but they are obviously real costs, in the sense that they reduce the revenues available for
other public policy purposes.
Compliance Costs
Equally obvious to taxpayers, though not recorded in the government budget, are the
compliance costs that taxpayers incur in meeting their tax obligations, over and above the
actual payment of tax. Tax administration costs may sometimes be reduced by increasing
compliance costs – as when taxpayers are required to provide more information in order
to make tax administration easier and less costly. In other instances, however, both
compliance costs and administration costs may increase if, for instance, a more
sophisticated tax administration requires more information from taxpayers and then
undertakes more audits on the basis of this information. Third parties also incur
compliance costs. For example, employers withhold income taxes from employees, and
banks provide taxing authorities information or may collect and remit taxes to
government. Compliance costs include the financial and time costs of complying with
the tax law, such as acquiring the knowledge and information needed to do so, setting up
required accounting systems, obtaining and transmitting the required data, and payments
to professional advisors. Although the measurement of such costs is still in its infancy,
Canadian studies suggest that compliance costs are probably at least four to five times
larger than direct administrative costs.7 In particular, the evidence shows that compliance
costs are relatively a much greater burden on smaller than on larger firms.
Efficiency Costs of Tax-Induced Decisions
In addition to administrative and compliance costs, taxes generally impose real economic
costs (often called deadweight losses or excess burdens) which reduce the total resources
available for public and private purposes. These ‘distortion costs’; arise essentially
because most taxes alter the decisions made by businesses and individuals because the
imposition of the tax changes the relative prices they confront. There are a few
exceptions. Lump-sum taxes, where the tax burden is the same regardless of any
behavioural responses by taxpayers, are often used to provide a base-line case in tax
analysis although such taxes seldom exist in practice. More practically important is the
fact that to the extent that taxes fall on economic “rents” – payments to factors above
those needed to induce them into the activity concerned – they too may not affect
economic activity. Well-designed taxes on natural resources and land, for example, may
thus to some extent produce revenue without economic distortion. Finally, in certain
instances, taxes – again, if properly designed – may actually change economic behaviour
in a way that improves well-being, of the person concerned, of the community as a
6

On average over the 2001-2007 period, the administrative costs of the Canada Revenue Agency were
1.2% of revenue collected (calculated from data in OECD (2009)). Canada’s direct administrative costs for
taxation tend to be higher than countries those in the United States largely because a substantial part of
Canada’s income support system is operated through the tax system (as discussed in Kerr, McKenzie and
Mintz 2012).
7
A recent study estimates that compliance costs in Canada are between 4 and 6 times greater than
administrative costs: see Vaillancourt, Clemens, and Palacios (2008).
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whole, or both. Certain environmental levies, for example, or even crude proxies such as
taxes on fuel, may to some extent have such effects. Such instances of good taxes – those
with no bad economic effects – should of course be exploited as fully as possible;
similarly, well-designed user charges should be used to the extent possible, given public
policy objectives, to finance certain public sector activities that specifically benefit
identifiable individuals. In the end, however, most taxes needed to finance government
inevitably give rise to changes in behaviour that, it is usually assumed, reduce the
efficiency with which resources are used and hence lower the output and potential wellbeing of the country as a whole. No matter how well the government uses the resources
acquired through taxation, everyone loses from the negative consequences of tax-induced
changes in behaviour, so one concern in designing tax policy is to limit such efficiency
losses.
For example, taxes on wages (personal income taxes, CPP, etc) obviously reduce
incentives to work by reducing the amount of income people receive for giving up a
certain amount of leisure (non-working) time. Consumption taxes like the GST and the
provincial sales taxes similarly may discourage work by increasing the amount of time
one must work to pay for goods and services through the marketplace. Taxes on both
wages and consumption thus alter both relative prices (in this case, the net - after-tax wage) and income. However, people may choose to work more to compensate for lost
income. The net effect on work of any tax change reflects both this income effect and the
effect of the change in relative prices (the substitution effect). Although the evidence is
not always clear or strong, on the whole taxes do clearly have some effect on work
decisions, with the precise strength and nature of the effects depending upon the structure
of taxes, the nature of the workforce, and the changing economic context. In particular,
the substitution effect (the change in the relative reward for working) creates distortions
by causing people to change such work-related decisions as when to enter the labour
force, how much education to attain, what career to pursue, how long and hard to work,
and when to retire. If those decisions were economically efficient before the tax, the
effect of such tax-induced distortions – their efficiency cost -- is to reduce the potential
output of the nation.
Taxation may similarly affect other economic decisions. Consumption taxes like the
GST/HST may discourage the consumption of taxed as opposed to untaxed goods.
Excises on fuel, alcohol, and cigarettes can reduce the consumption of these items.8
Income taxes, because they tax the return to savings, may alter the amount of savings or
the form in which savings are held. For example, failure to tax capital gains until they
are realized (when the asset is sold) encourages the holding of assets (a lock-in effect).
Taxes may also affect investment, and such effects may be especially important when
economies are more open to trade and investment. Foreign investors may choose to
locate their activities in a particular country for many reasons such as the relative costs of
production, access to markets, and sound infrastructure but taxes too may influence their
choice of location. To the extent taxes lower the after-tax return on investments in a
country or a region, the level of investment and hence growth may be lower than it would
8

As noted earlier, not all such effects need be bad: for instance, if tobacco consumption falls, people may
live longer, healthier and more productive lives.
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otherwise be. Corporate income taxes may also influence the composition of a firm’s
capital structure (use of debt or equity financing) or dividend policy. For example,
retained earnings are encouraged when dividends are subject to tax at the shareholder
level and debt is preferred over equity where interest on debt capital is deductible and
dividends paid from equity capital are not.
Tax Effects and Economic Choices
Exactly how important such tax effects are is a matter of considerable debate, but the
consensus is that they are much more important than was thought thirty or forty years ago
and that the efficiency costs of taxation are a considerable multiple of the administrative
and compliance costs mentioned above. About a decade ago the Canadian Department of
Finance estimated the marginal efficiency cost – the estimated loss in national welfare as
a result of increasing taxes by $1 – of the corporate income tax (CIT) as $1.55, compared
to only $0.56 for the personal income tax (PIT), $0.27 for payroll taxes (like the CPP)
and $0.17 for the GST.9 Given the composition of tax revenues in Canada, these figures
suggest that the efficiency costs of the existing tax system are much greater than the
combined administrative and compliance costs of taxation, with taxes like CIT that affect
intertemporal decisions – saving and investment – being particularly costly in these
terms.
If one is prepared to assume that the efficiency costs of taxation result from conscious
policy decisions (for example, to redistribute income through the fiscal system), the price
may be worth paying. Unfortunately, however, it is all too easy to underestimate the
damage done by inefficient taxes. Although efficiency losses are definitely real, they are
not directly visible. The efficiency cost of taxation arises because something does not
happen: some activity did not occur or occurred in some other form. Since these ‘hidden
costs’ can only be estimated by rather complex and hard-to-understand economic models,
although achieving a more economically efficient tax system would make Canada as a
whole better off it seems unlikely to be either a politically popular or readily
understandable policy aim. Output that is not produced, however, is still output lost, and
since there is no conceivably acceptable rationale for inflicting “pain” without “gain”, an
important and sensible tax policy objective for tax policy designers always and
everywhere is to attempt to minimize the efficiency losses from taxation to the extent
other policy considerations permit.
Taking Account of Tax Costs
To minimize imposing unnecessary costs through taxation, experience suggests three
general rules should be followed.
Tax Base Breadth
First, tax bases should be as broad as possible. A broad-based consumption tax, for
example, will still discourage work effort but at least such a tax reduces distortions in
9

As reported in OECD (1997). More recent detailed analysis generally yields similar rankings (Bibbee
2008).
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consumption by taxing a broader range of goods and services uniformly. 10 A more
broadly-based consumption tax like the GST/HST that encompasses a wide range of
services is much more efficient than the provincial retail sales tax, which excludes many
services while at the same time it taxes many ‘investment’ goods (such as computers and
other office equipment), essentially because it is less likely to distort consumption (and
investment) decisions. A few items, such as fuel, tobacco products and alcohol, may be
taxed at a relatively higher rate – for administrative simplicity, preferably a rate imposed
through separate excise taxes -- either because of regulatory reasons or because the
demand for these products is relatively unresponsive to taxation. Finally, for similar
reasons, in principle the tax base for income tax should also be as broad as possible,
treating all income, no matter from what source, as uniformly as possible.11
Tax Rates and Rate Induced Distortions
Second, tax rates should be set as low as possible, given revenue needs. The reason is
simply because the efficiency cost of taxes arises from their effect on relative prices, and
the size of this effect is directly related to the tax rate. The distortionary effect of taxes
generally increases proportionally to the square of the tax rate, so that (other things being
equal) doubling the rate of a tax implies a fourfold increase in its efficiency costs. From
an efficiency perspective, it is thus better to raise revenue by imposing a single rate on a
broad base rather than dividing that base into segments and imposing differential rates on
each segment. Of course, any efficiency costs of differential treatment needs to be
balanced against the equity arguments noted below for imposing graduated rate
schedules.
Location Effects
Third, from an efficiency perspective, it is especially important that careful attention be
given to taxes on production. Taxes on production affect the location of businesses, alter
the ways in which production takes place, change the forms in which business is
conducted, and so forth. This is one of the main reasons that value-added taxes (VATs)
like Canada’s (federal) GST and (provincial) HST are superior to other forms of general
consumption tax such as the provincial retail sales tax. This dictum also implies that
taxing corporate income is unlikely to be a good idea. On the other hand, some form of
taxation on corporate income is generally considered essential both to prevent tax
avoidance by those who own corporations and to collect taxes from foreign-owned firms.
The appropriate design of corporate income taxation is thus a particularly difficult ask,
10

In theory, in order to minimize efficiency losses different tax rates should be imposed on each
commodity, with higher rates imposed on those goods and services where the changes in behaviour are the
smallest as well as on those that are complementary to leisure (in order to reduce the negative impact of
taxation on work decisions by in effect imposing some taxation on ‘non-work’ or leisure). To do so,
however, requires much more information about how taxes alter behaviour than is available in most
countries. Moreover, this approach does not take administrative and equity concerns into account. In
general, expert consensus is thus that in practice it is probably generally advisable to impose a uniform tax
rate to the extent possible.
11
As Section 2 below suggests, however, consideration of the ‘open economy’ nature of many countries
casts some doubt on this conclusion.
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not least because of the changing reality of the international context we discuss in Section
2 below.
1.4

Equity and Fairness

Fairness or equity is a key issue in designing a tax regime. Indeed, from one perspective,
taxes exist primarily to secure equity. National governments do not need taxes to secure
funds because they can simply print the money they need. Indeed, the tax system can be
seen in essence as a mechanism for taking control of resources away from the private
sector in as efficient, equitable, and administratively effective way as possible, in order to
redirect them to serve public objectives that would otherwise be unattainable.
Structural Equity
What is considered equitable or fair by one person may differ from the conceptions held
by others. Traditionally, as already mentioned, fairness has been understood in the tax
context in terms of horizontal and vertical equity. Horizontal equity requires those in
similar circumstances to pay the same amount of taxes. Vertical equity requires
appropriate differences among taxpayers in different economic circumstances. Equity in
these senses often embraces some notion of ability or capacity to pay. Such concepts
have intuitive appeal but are of very limited usefulness when it comes to determining tax
policy. These traditional equity concepts do not determine or even necessarily inform
substantively what good tax policy is; nor do they allow us to characterize decisions that
seem to deviate from them to be ‘bad’ tax policy.12 At most, they perhaps serve as a point
of reference for measuring the effects of choices that in one way or another appear to
deviate from these concepts.
Fairness and Tax Burden
Consider several possible conceptions of fairness. To some, fairness may require
everyone to pay the same amount of tax. For example, the tax system might impose a
head tax on each individual over the age of 18 years old. Or, more plausibly, one might
perhaps require all taxpayers to pay the same rate of tax on their income. To others,
however, fairness requires those taxpayers with higher income to pay a higher percentage
of their income in tax. Although a progressive rate structure has a rather shaky theoretical
foundation, it has been the most common income tax rate structure. Many find assessing
progressive taxes on income (as measure of ability to pay) attractive simply on the
grounds that the rich are better able to contribute to the financing government.

12

For example, to make the concept of horizontal equity useful one must determine which differences are
important and why these differences justify different tax treatment. Unless people have identical tastes and
a single type of ability or income, it is difficult to derive any clear policy implications from this concept.
One must also decide whether to focus only on a short time period, such as one year, or take a longer,
lifetime perspective. Similarly, it matters whether one takes into account the impact of other taxes and the
provision of government services or other benefits. Even more disagreement exists about the usefulness of
the concept of vertical equity and about what constitutes appropriate differences in treatment.
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Fairness and the Choice of Tax Bases
On the other hand, consumption tax proponents question whether any income tax system
can be fair. One approach takes a societal view. Income is what individuals contribute to
society; consumption is what they take away from the pot. Therefore, if we want a
society that will continue to grow and prosper, we are better off taxing consumption
rather than income. A second approach considers consumption as a better measure of a
household’s ability to pay. Because income varies more than consumption over a
person’s or household’s lifetime, some argue that it may be better to use consumption as
the base for taxation rather than income. Finally, since income taxes impose higher taxes
on households with higher savings, the income tax penalizes savers over those who
consume currently.
On the other hand, income tax proponents claim that a person’s net increase in economic
wealth is a better measurement of ability to pay than the use of their income. Someone
who earns $1 million and spends $10 has a greater ability to pay someone who (in the
same time period) earns $10 and spends $10. Under a consumption tax, both would bear
the same tax burden while under an income tax, the first person would bear a much
greater tax burden. Of course, this is only a two-period example, which assumes that a
year is the right period in which to assess the relative tax status of different people. If
one thinks that most people go out of this world as they come into it – with no worldly
goods – by definition their income and consumption are equal from a lifetime
perspective. Many issues – such as the regressivity or progressivity of different taxes –
may thus look very different depending upon the time period that is considered relevant
for purposes of assessing tax fairness.13
Fairness and Over-riding Political, Social and Economic Policy
The previous comments suggest that discussions of fairness in general or of horizontal
and vertical equity in particular, are, by themselves, of limited usefulness. Without first
specifying a fundamental ethical framework one cannot evaluate the relative fairness of
different proposals or different tax regimes. Moreover, even if one sets out such a
framework, and is prepared to assert that everyone else should accept it also, it does not
follow that they will do so. In the end, it is thus only through its political institutions that
any country can really define and implement a view of what is an acceptably fair tax
system. One may not like what politicians do, but what they do is what, whether we
realize it or not, we have at some fundamental level chosen to do as a society. Of course,
policy choices may also be affected by various collateral influences on the need for and
effectiveness of government policy, including influences exogenous to the national
economy such as those we address under the label of ‘globalization” in Sections 2 and 3
below.
In any event, rather than discussing, interminably, such inherently controversial
philosophical questions as equity it might be best to focus directly on the expected
13

For a discussion of how sensitive studies of tax incidence in Canada (as elsewhere) are to assumptions
about the relevant time period and many other arguable aspects, see Kesselman and Cheung (2004).
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consequences of different policy choices. As has already been indicated at several points,
the estimated impacts of policy are themselves often hard to determine with any certainty.
Nonetheless, answers may perhaps be obtained to some factual questions. The same
cannot be said about policy debates reflecting different philosophical (or ideological)
beliefs – unless one is, as suggested above, prepared to accept whatever emerges from a
country’s political institutions as having resolved all such debates! In the practical policy
world if, from the perspective of social and economic inequality, what matters in the end
is the overall impact of the budgetary system on the distribution of wealth and income
then both expenditures and taxes should be taken into account. Taxes affect equity in
many and complex ways, and different citizens may view many of these consequences
differently. Some may wish to favour cities and those who live in them, for selfish or
developmental reasons; for similar interested or disinterested reasons, others may wish to
favour farmers and those who live in rural areas. Similarly, some may wish to favour
rich savers in the name of growth and others the poor in the name of fairness and
redistribution. However, since presumably all are ultimately interested in outcomes,
good tax policy should be based as much as possible on evidence-based research into
consequences rather than faith-based presuppositions. Equally, there is much to be said
for ensuring that the debate on both evidence and philosophy be as inclusive as possible
and that due attention is paid to ensuring procedural equity through as open, transparent
and comprehensive a policy process as possible.
Distributional Effects and Goals
Like most policy instruments, tax policy can play many tunes. What is critical from an
equity perspective is, first, to be as aware as possible of the distributional implications of
tax changes not only for income distribution in general but also for the different groups
that are evidently of policy concern in most countries -- the old, homeowners, children,
the poor, people in depressed regions, etc. -- and, second, to ensure that the actual
outcome of such reforms is as consistent as possible with the intended outcome. For
instance, although taxes cannot make the poor richer, they may certainly make them even
poorer, in both absolute and relative terms. Since it is hard to conceive of any socially
desirable reason to adopt increased poverty as a policy goal, heavy taxes on items that
constitute major consumption expenditures for poor people should generally be avoided.
There are two caveats to this conclusion, however. First, in some instances there may be
an overwhelming social argument for even quite regressive taxes, as many think there is
with respect to tobacco taxes, for example. Second, if regressive taxes provide a
significantly less costly source of revenue, as the data cited earlier on the marginal
efficiency costs of different forms of taxation implies, and any undesirable distributional
effects of such taxes can be offset by direct expenditures or adjustments elsewhere in the
tax system (such as income tax credits), such taxes may have an important role to play in
the tax system as a whole.14

14

As noted earlier, Canada uses the income tax system extensively to provide income support to certain
low-income people. While important, the potential use of tax policy as the basis for a more efficient and
equitable transfer policy is not discussed further in this chapter.
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On the other hand, taxation is one of the few ways short of outright confiscation in which
the wealthy may be made less wealthy. Although the evidence seems to be that taxes
have had at best only moderate success in reducing income inequality in developed
countries and that those countries that have more effective redistributive policies have
implemented them mainly through more progressive expenditure policies,15 some degree
of explicitly redistributive taxation might nonetheless be considered to be socially or
politically essential as one component of maintaining and sustaining the state. On the
other hand, if the major concern is to help those who most need help, that objective is
much more likely to be achieved through expenditure than tax policy, and the policy
balance may shift from progressive to more proportional means of financing
redistributive expenditures, as is generally the case in the ‘social welfare’ countries of
northern Europe.
Incidence – Who Pays?
Turning back to economics, in order to determine the fairness of a tax regime, one must
also consider carefully who ‘really’ pays taxes – what economists call the ‘incidence’ of
taxation. The person or entity required by law to pay a tax need not be the one whose
economic well-being is reduced by the imposition of the tax. In the end taxes always
‘burden’ or fall on individuals in their roles as consumers, producers and factor (labour,
capital) suppliers and not on corporations or other institutional abstractions. For example,
although the VAT requires firms to pay VAT on their sales, it is both expected and likely
true that the real economic incidence of the tax falls on the ultimate consumer. Similarly,
although motor fuel taxes are in practice collected from distributors, the full burden of
such taxes is usually considered to be borne by consumers just as the full burden of the
personal income tax is usually assumed to be borne by the person who pays it. In all
these cases, however, these are at best plausible assumptions rather than empiricallybased facts. In other instances, even plausible assumptions about who actually bears the
economic costs of taxation are hard to find. For example, property taxes may be
ultimately paid (in the sense of reducing the income of) either owners of land and capital
(who also bear the legal incidence) or by the users or renters of the property, depending
upon market conditions. Asking for a definitive answer about which groups, let alone
individuals, pay the property tax is like asking for certainty about which NHL team will
win the Stanley Cup in any year.
Who pays the corporate income tax is even more difficult to assert with any confidence,
especially in an open economy such as Canada – and, to some extent, most countries.16
15

For example, the study of incidence in Canada by Kesselman and Cheung (2004) concludes that, despite
the wide variety of outcomes that are conceptually possible within the framework of empirical incidence
studies, under most ‘reasonable’ assumptions taxes are progressive, if at all, only with respect to the top
decile of taxpayers, and that transfers are much more important in terms of reducing inequality.
16
Although this point is not strictly relevant to the incidence issue discussed in the text, we should note
that, unlike the case in the United States, Canada’s corporate income tax is ‘integrated’ to a considerable
extent with the personal income tax for Canadian residents. Nonetheless, Canada, like most countries,
continues to impose some corporate income tax that is not offset by credits at the individual level.
Although we also do not discuss here other possible rationales for corporate taxation as a means of taxing
economic ‘rents’ and income accruing to foreign residents, it is worth noting a recent argument that the
corporate income tax is an important part of the tax system primarily because it can (and does) serve as a an
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Corporations are in essence simply legal constructs. Taxes imposed on corporations
ultimately must fall on individuals: but which individuals? Conceptually, corporate
income taxes may lead to shareholders (or, perhaps even the owners of all forms of
capital, including houses and pensions) receiving lower returns. Or they may result in
consumers paying higher prices, or workers receiving lower wages, or any conceivable
combination of these outcomes. In addition, the immediate impact of a tax in the short
run may differ substantially from its incidence in different macroeconomic (cyclical)
conditions as well as from its long-run incidence after all market adjustments take place.
The incidence of a corporate income tax thus depends on such complex matters as the
openness of the overall economy in terms of the inflows and outflows of capital
investment, the extent to which capital moves between the corporate and unincorporated
sectors, the relative capital-intensity of corporations, and the elasticity of demand for
goods produced by corporations and other businesses. Such factors and the relations
between them are not easy to measure and the outcomes of particular tax policy changes
in this area are inherently difficult to understand -- and hence perhaps especially likely to
based on assumptions rather than evidence.
Other considerations add to the difficulty of trying to determine the tax burden of both
individuals and groups of individuals in different income classes. For example, the more
taxes that there are, the more difficult it becomes to untangle the incidence of any
particular tax change from the cumulative and interactive effects of the total group of
taxes. Moreover, a complete analysis of incidence requires consideration of all parts of
government activities including both government expenditure programs and regulatory
policies. For example, a complete analysis of the incidence of social insurance payroll
taxes requires estimates not only of the incidence of the tax but also of the retirement
benefits provided. All in all, when it comes to the distributional impact of most tax
changes we are generally operating even more in a world of assumption and conjecture
than is the case with respect to the efficiency aspects of taxation.
1.5

Administrability

Since the best tax policy in the world is worth little if it cannot be implemented
effectively, tax policy design must also take into account the administrative dimension of
taxation. What can be done may to a considerable extent determine what is done. This
factor shapes tax policy in particular in the international sphere, as discussed further
below. More generally, as already mentioned, the resources used in administering and
complying with taxes (or, for that matter, evading them) are real economic costs that
diminish the ability of the economy to provide goods and services. Good tax policy

important regulatory instrument (Avi-Yonath 2011). In this “one tax-one goal” view, the main objective in
designing general consumption taxes is to obtain revenue in the least costly way possible, the main
objective with respect to designing personal income taxes is to achieve the socially desired amount of
redistribution through the tax system, and the main objective in designing corporate income taxes is to
influence large businesses to make decisions in line with public policy objectives.
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requires keeping such costs as low as possible while also achieving such objectives as
revenue, growth, and redistribution as effectively as possible. This is no small task.
System Design
Three ingredients seem essential to effective tax administration: the political will to
administer the tax system effectively, a clear strategy for achieving this goal and adequate
resources for the task. It helps, of course, if the tax system is well designed, appropriate
for the country, and relatively simple, but even the best designed tax system cannot be
properly implemented unless these three conditions are fulfilled. Most attention is often
paid to the resource problem - the need to have sufficient trained officials, adequate
information technology and so on. However, without a sound implementation strategy,
even adequate resources will not ensure success. And without sufficient political support,
even the best strategy cannot be effectively implemented.
Collecting Information and Tax
Effective tax administration requires not only qualified tax officials but also, in largely
‘self-enforced’ system like those in Canada and the United States, a good deal of
information supplied by taxpayers and related third parties such as banks, other
businesses, and tax practitioners, particularly accountants. Tax officials must be able to
know about and collect the information needed for effective administration from
taxpayers, relevant third parties, and other government agencies, all of whom need to
comply with their reporting responsibilities. The administration must store all this
information in an accessible and useful fashion. And, most importantly, it must use the
information to ensure that those who should be on the tax rolls, are, that those who should
file returns, do, that those who should pay on time, do, and that those who do not comply
are identified, prosecuted and punished as appropriate. All this is easy to say but hard to
do. However, the task is not impossible and for the most part tax administrators in most
developed countries manage to do a good job.
As we discuss further in Section 2, however, globalization confronts tax administrations
with new and difficult problems. For example, tax administrations must ensure that
revenues and expenses occurring in other countries are properly calculated in determining
taxable profits for the corporate income tax, and that export credits and refunds are
properly handled under VATs like Canada’s GST/HST. Enforcing a tax system is neither
an easy nor a static task in any country. It is especially difficult in an open economy with
many cross-border transactions and in rapidly changing economic conditions like those in
recent decades. Unless this task is tackled with seriousness and consistency, however,
even the best designed tax system will fail to produce good results.
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1.6

Taxation and growth

Is There a Connection?
Growth is seen by many as an objective that tax policy should accommodate. Although
much has been written and said about the effects of taxation on growth, there is still much
we do not understand about this complex subject.17 Consider, for example, the trade-off
between growth and equity. Most people would like to be richer. Many may also want
the increased wealth to be distributed fairly. Are these objectives compatible? As
mentioned earlier, collective action through the fiscal system presumably to some extent
makes us better off both as a community and as individual citizens. However, many may
be less aware of the public benefits than of the private costs from giving up control over
some of their resources to the government. Measuring public interests through the lens of
private interest obviously distorts perceptions of what is good tax policy. For this and
other reasons, although many theoretical and empirical explorations have been made of
the potential growth-equity trade-off, no simple or definitive answer to this key question
is possible.
What seems clearer, however, is that there is no magic tax strategy to encourage
economic growth. Some countries with high tax burdens have high growth rates and
some countries with low tax burdens have low growth rates. Looking at the relationship
between growth rates and tax rates in Canada over the last 50 years shows, for example,
that Canada has had some of its periods of fastest economic growth during those years
where the tax rates were the highest.18 Of course, this does not in any way imply that
high tax rates are the key to economic growth. It may be that growth rates in Canada
would have been even higher in years with high tax rates if rates had been lower. The
point is simply that the relationship between taxes and growth is complex. Just as
nominal tax rates often provide little information as to the real effective tax rates imposed
on different individuals and different activities, tax-GDP ratios alone convey no
information about the level and productivity of the government infrastructure and
services associated with those tax dollars.
Growth Strategies
Consider what a tax system might look like if economic growth were the main policy
objective. For one thing, to avoid discouraging entrepreneurship and risk-taking, there
would probably be little or no taxation of profits since such taxes make these activities
less rewarding. In particular, there is little economic rationale for taxing what economists
often call normal profits, by which they mean (more or less) the average rate of return
17
18

A useful review of the complex tax-growth relationship may be found in Johansson et al. (2008).
The year to year or even decade to decade relationship between growth rates and tax ratios is not
particularly strong, but to illustrate the point made in the text consider two extreme cases, the 1960s
when the average annual rate of real GDP growth was 4.5%, and the years since 2000, when the
average annual growth rate was only 1.5%: in the first of these periods, the tax-GDP ratio rose sharply
from 23.7% to 30.1%; in the second, however, the tax ratio decreased from 34.6% to 32.8%. (Data on
GDP growth from World Development Indicators (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worlddevelopment-indicators); data on tax ratio from Treff and Ort (2010).)
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available from investments with the same degree of risk (that is, the risk that they may
lose rather than make money for the investor). On the other hand, a good economic case
can be made for taxing so-called supra-normal profits as heavily as possible since, by
definition, the additional (above average) return on investment is not needed to induce the
activity in question.19 Although it is not easy to distinguish “normal” from “excess”
profit, a number of business tax schemes intended to achieve this objective have been put
forward and even introduced to a limited extent in a few countries in recent years.
On the other hand, even if there is little economic case for taxing ‘normal’ profits, when a
personal income tax is imposed some taxation of such profits is often needed to prevent
people from placing assets in a corporation to avoid personal income taxes.20 In addition,
profits taxes may also be seen as way of ensuring that the public sector in countries that
host foreign investments receives some share of the profits earned by foreign investors.21
On the whole, however, high taxes on profits are most unlikely to form part of a growthoriented tax strategy. At most a reasonably low and stable broad-based profits (or other
form of business) tax may be imposed for the reasons just mentioned.
A second growth-oriented tax strategy might be to tax consumption more than income.
The difference between consumption and income is saving, and from the perspective of
encouraging, more saving is usually better than less. If domestic savings are essential to
financing domestic investment or if for some (not very clear) reason a premium is placed
on having domestic savers invest in domestic investment, an argument can be made for
taxing income from savings more lightly or at least for having domestic saving invested
in domestic companies taxed more lightly. The particular form of ‘corporate-personal tax
integration’ found in Canada, for example, seems to be motivated by some such
objective. Most importantly, however, in addition to a relatively low and stable tax on
profits a purely growth-oriented tax system may thus place heavier reliance on a broadbased consumption tax such as the VAT (the GST/HST in Canada).
Growth Versus Other Objectives
What is conspicuously missing in this picture, of course, is any explicit mention of a
personal income tax or any concern for fairness in taxation. However, from a broader
19

Rather confusingly, economists often call such ‘excess’ profits (or other returns to particular activities
that are not essential to induce people to carry out those activities) ‘economic rents’: the terminology is
confusing because not only are such returns not ‘rents’ in the ordinary sense of the term but they are also
not really ‘economic’ since, by definition, they are not necessary to induce any economically advantageous
action
20
‘Integration’ – a method of treating corporate taxes (fully or partially) as ‘withheld’ personal income
taxes (see note 16 above) – was developed in part as a way of reconciling the desire to reduce or eliminate
taxes on corporations to achieve growth or other non-fiscal objectives while at the same time sustaining a
viable personal income tax.
21
As discussed earlier, since the economic, social and political context furnishes the framework in which
profit-making activity of any kind can take place in a safe and regularized way, it seems both fair and
economically efficient for that infrastructure to be financed by those who benefit from it. Non-residents
carrying on business in most countries are therefore taxed (on their locally- sourced income) in the same
way as residents because their activities depend on and take advantage of the domestic economic, political
and social infrastructure in equivalent ways.
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perspective, such a tax may also be considered to be a critical component of the design
and implementation of a sustainable tax system in a democratic setting, just as in Canada
and the United States provincial or state access to both income and sales taxes (as well as
continued heavy use of the (ancient) real property tax at the local level) may be seen as
essential components of the maintenance of a viable and democratic federation. Indeed,
the dilemma facing contemporary tax policy designers is essentially how to keep the tax
system both compatible with the country’s economic needs in the changing international
context discussed in Section 2 and sustainable politically within the domestic political
context. We return to this issue in Section 3.

1.7

Non-fiscal Objectives of Taxation

Governments often use the tax system as a device to induce or alter particular economic
circumstances and private sector choices and behaviour to achieve various government
objectives. This may involve the introduction and propagation of a variety of tax
incentives -- for investment, for savings, for exports, for employment, for regional
development, and so on. Often, such incentives are redundant and ineffective, giving up
revenue and complicating the fiscal system without achieving their stated objectives.
Even to the extent that incentives may be effective, for example, in inducing investors to
behave differently than they would have done in response to market signals, the result
may often be distorting and inefficient, diverting scarce resources into less than optimal
uses. Indeed, some argue that selective tax incentives can improve economic
performance only if government officials are better able to decide the best types and
means of production than are private investors. On the whole, experience suggests that
such non-tax factors as a sound macroeconomic policy, good infrastructure and a stable
governance system are much more important factors in affecting business decisions than
tax benefits.
Nonetheless, most countries have a variety of special tax incentives, that attempt to
achieve many non-fiscal policy objectives, ranging from improved access to housing and
stronger pension financing to encouraging the adoption of particular ‘green’ or other
technologies. Whether or not a good idea in principle, in practice such tax incentives
need to be well-designed, properly implemented, and periodically evaluated if they are to
do more good than harm.
In principle, the tax system can certainly be used to encourage or discourage certain
activities. For example, taxes can be used to correct market failures such as positive or
negative externalities. Externalities exist when market prices fail to reflect all the benefits
or costs associated with an activity. The classic negative externality is pollution. Firms
that pollute affect the welfare of others, often in a way that is outside the market
mechanism. The presence of externalities could prompt different types of government
action. The government could regulate the activity by providing rules of conduct and
penalties for failure to comply. It could establish clear property rights, such that all
affected parties would be brought together and bargain in a manner that could result in
the parties accounting for the costs and benefits of their activities. An alternative (or
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complementary) approach may be to use the tax system as a tool to correct for
externalities. A tax on pollution may correct for market failure by requiring polluting
firms to bear the cost of pollution. Similarly, as mentioned earlier a rationale for special
excise taxes on tobacco, alcohol, and motor vehicle fuel is to impose on users of these
products an additional cost that in effect forces them to take into account to some extent
the negative externalities resulting for others that arise from their consumption decisions.
Even apart from such market failures, policymakers may use the tax system to encourage
or discourage certain activities. Various tax provisions are intended, for example, to
encourage such activities as retirement savings, gifts to charities, and home ownership.
Such activities could be, and in fact sometimes are also be, subsidized directly though
grants and other programs or indirectly through the tax system.
Although the costs in term of forgone revenue of most such “tax expenditures” are
reported regularly in both Canada and the United States,22 no formal account is taken of
such outlays in the normal budgeting process, so the extent to which such reporting
ensures adequate accountability is suspect. For example, we know the (estimated) tax
revenue forgone by the tax subsidization of private gifts to charity23 but there is
surprisingly little public discussion of whether the public benefits from thus facilitating
the partial expropriation by private interests of activities that are largely publicly funded
are sufficient to make such incentives on balance socially desirable.
It may sometimes make economic sense to follow the tax expenditure route to achieving
a particular policy goal rather than the economically equivalent route of increasing taxes
and then spending the revenues in grants to the favoured activities. On the other hand,
one reason some tax concessions are introduced may be precisely because more open
expenditures on the favoured activities would be politically more difficult to implement
and less popular. A serious potential cost of the tax expenditure route is a loss of control
over whether and to what extent the targeted objectives are achieved and monitored.
Unlike a grant system tax, tax expenditures leave to those who obtain the direct benefit
(reduced taxes) of those expenditures the manner in which “qualifying” activities are
carried out and for whose ultimate benefit. As past experience has shown, unless such
expenditures are carefully designed and monitored to anticipate possible abuses or
leakage to unintended potential claimants, their effects may differ substantially from the
stated intention.24 On the whole, it seems all too likely that in most countries far more
tax ‘tinkering’ than is optimal is done in the name of a wide variety of ‘good’ things, with
the consequence that the tax system as a whole is substantially more costly than
necessary and hence a less efficient revenue-raiser than it could be.

22

For Canada, several hundred such ‘tax expenditures’ are listed in Department of Finance (2011).
Department of Finance (2011) reports that for 2009 the estimated (federal) ‘tax expenditure’ associated
with charities in Canada was about $2.2 billion for individuals, at least another $0.5 billion at the corporate
level, and about $1.1 billion in the form of GST rebates and exemptions, or in total almost $4 billion.
24
For example, the “scientific research and experimental development” tax credit introduced in Canada
some years ago spawned a litany of projects of dubious public benefit, and was exploited by various private
tax shelter investment schemes to the point where it ended up providing little or no real support to the
activities it was supposed to finance.
23
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1.8

The Intergovernmental Dimension

Reforming tax policy is always a complex and difficult exercise in any country. It is
particularly so countries like Canada in which both federal and provincial governments
have important income and consumption taxes. Both the design and implementation of
tax policy at one level of government needs to be carried out with full and explicit
attention to the possible reactions of the other level. Tax policy decisions are not made in
a vacuum. Nor are they made, as seems sometimes to be assumed, by a benevolent
government. Rather, they reflect a set of complex social and political interactions
between different groups in society in a context established by history and, among other
things, by the administrative capacity of the state. Taxation is not simply a means of
financing government. It is also one of the most visible parts of the social contract
underlying the state. The success of any tax policy thus depends in large part upon how
different political groups perceive the reform and how they react. For example, those
who will have to pay more must be convinced that they will, so to speak, get something
worthwhile for their money. Those who will not pay more must also get behind reform if
it is to succeed. The bureaucracy, those who will have to implement reform, must also
support it, or at least not actively oppose it.
Some see the inevitable political processes underlying tax reform as inherently “statist” in
the sense that the state can be viewed as an institution in its own right that seeks to
maintain and increase its capacity, including its capacity to collect taxes. Others see
acceptance of increased tax burdens as inextricably entwined with the expansion of a
more democratic polity and a more inclusive society. For citizens to pay more they must
get more of what they want. For this process to work as it must -- to be both honest and
to be seen to be honest -- the public finances should be both transparent and accountable.
For example ‘earmarking’ revenues to favoured objectives - although a practice usually
disliked by budgetary and public finance experts because it is all too likely to distort
budgetary decisions - may sometimes prove to be a politically essential component of a
successful tax reform.
To take an important example in current Canadian public policy, separating tax and
expenditure decisions by levels of government to the extent that Canada does with
respect to the health area will perhaps not prove to be sustainable in the long run. The
long-term solution may lie either in moving more health expenditure decisions ‘up’ to the
federal level or more revenue decisions ‘down’ to the provinces in order to re-establish
the democratic connection between taxing and spending. In either case, forging a
stronger explicit spending-taxation link as well as clearer democratic accountability at
both federal and provincial levels may prove to be an essential ingredient in using the tax
system in part as one instrument to maintain and sustain federalism and indeed perhaps
Canada. As this example suggests, the relevant policy objectives that shape Canadian
taxation may extend much beyond the conventional trinity of equity, efficiency and
administrability with which this section began. Much the same may be said in other
countries.
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Tax Policy in the ‘New’ World Economy

What is good (or even feasible) tax policy becomes even more complicated when one
recognizes that the geographic borders do not define the limits within which tax policy
decisions focused on the welfare of citizens take place. Countries no longer have the
luxury of designing and implementing their tax systems in isolation. The interdependence
of national economies has always been a factor in shaping and implementing social,
industrial, economic, and tax policy. In part for this reason, the traditional tax policy
paradigm discussed in Section 1 has always been far from comprehensive and may no
longer work very well even as an indicative tool. Historically, the limits of tax and
economic activity have been understood and defined largely by reference to the physical
connections of those activities with observable trade flows of various kinds. In this
world, the communities in which production occurred and was consumed were readily
evident, and suitable adjustments via various forms of trade and tax regulation could be
made to establish or protect the fairness of the implicit international bargain. When,
however, what a country produces – and hence supports and finances through its tax
system and broader economic, social and political infrastructure – flows through
cyberspace (the virtual economy) it may all too easily and invisibly be appropriated by
others beyond the country’s limits. In recent decades, the increased mobility of business
inputs, primarily capital, across national borders as well as changes in consumption and
production patterns have reduced the significance of national borders. Taxes have
become a more important factor in location decisions. There is increased tax competition
for direct investment, portfolio investment, qualified labour, financial services, markets,
and business headquarters. A country whose tax system differs substantially from other
countries with which it has important economic connections, may suffer (benefit) as a
result. All countries have to some extent lost some tax sovereignty and the adequacy of
some traditional tax policy imperatives and design features has come into question.
Economic Interaction and Incompatible Systems
Globalization has, for example, tightened the constraints on tax policy associated with
excessive complexity, tax avoidance and tax arbitrage. Incompatible legal and tax
systems increasingly encounter each other in ways not contemplated by traditional tax
policy. Tax systems do not mesh easily in practice in a context in which there is no
overall international tax design or administration. The increased possibilities for tax
minimization either as a self-selected choice by taxpayers or simply as a by-product of
the interaction of different legal regimes and tax systems reduce the reachable tax base
and hence to some extent at least put at risk the ability of governments to provide public
services. This looming ‘race to the bottom’ is exacerbated by the extent to which, with
increased financial innovation, the labels that largely determine who taxes what and how
much are losing their meanings.
Economic and tax policy choices must be implemented through legal systems that define
(and confine) how economic actors both organize their activities and enjoy rights and
bear obligations in relation to each other. All legal systems adopt fictions and forms to
establish the limits of economic and social intercourse such as notions of “property” and
the consequences of dealings through “contracts”. Since all such terms are invariably
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somewhat malleable, they generally permit economic activity through contracts that may
connect economic actors in ways that in effect create a private legal regime between them
that the general law cannot reasonably have anticipated.
Lawyers and investment
bankers can now with relative ease convert equity to debt, business profits to royalties,
leases to sales, and ordinary income to capital gains - or the other way around. They can
also customize the legal characteristics of economic actors, for example, so that they
appear to be corporations in one place and partnerships in another in such a way as to
minimize taxes. In attempting to cope with such matters, tax policy everywhere has
become more complex. Taxation is no longer simply a matter of tapping fairly welldefined pools of economic value (tax bases) that are closely associated with well-defined
political jurisdictions in a world in which the underlying legal and other infrastructure is
known and constant. In this new fiscal world it is increasingly difficult for tax
administrations everywhere to distinguish (presumably bad) ‘tax avoidance’ from
(presumably acceptable) ‘tax arbitrage’ or to translate the objectives and principles of tax
policy into the desired results.
The Former Context – Interactions With Seams
The traditional tax regime for taxing cross-border transactions in most countries rests on
a stylized set of facts: (i) small and evenly-balanced flows of cross border investments;
(ii) relatively small numbers of companies engaged in international operations; (iii) heavy
reliance on fixed assets for production; (iv) relatively small amounts of cross-border
portfolio investments by individuals; and (v) minor concerns with international mobility
of tax bases and international tax evasions. These assumptions underlie much of the
discussion of two common pillars of international tax policy architecture -- capital export
neutrality (CEN) and capital import neutrality (CIN). These concepts in effect attempt to
extent the common criteria of equity, efficiency and administrability discussed in Section
1 explicitly across international borders.
For example, CEN asserts that “home” and “away” investments should be treated
identically so that capital will flow where it may best – from a world perspective -- be
used. In contrast, CIN focuses on whether there are tax-induced biases that would
prejudice the use of imported capital in a jurisdiction by exposing it to taxation not faced
by competing local enterprises. Neither approach is without problems but in practice
CEN – the residence principle -- generally rules, at least in principle, with respect to the
taxation of passive (investment) income (that is, income that is not earned through active
exertion by the taxpayer away from the home jurisdiction and that has no necessary
geographic or jurisdiction connection other than where the taxpayer is located). On the
other hand, CIN – the source principle - is more commonly associated with active
(business) income, the premise being that there is a reliable, necessary, observable
connection of the income-earning activity to someplace other than the place where the
taxpayer legally resides. In this case, the first claim to tax revenues goes to the location of
production (the source) and the home (residence) tax is correspondingly eliminated or
reduced. Whether this traditional distinction between residence and source tax policy
poles is helpful in defining the kind of taxable connections that now exist between
taxpayers and tax systems is debatable (Bird and Wilkie 2000). In Canada, for example,
the Royal Commission on Taxation (1966), for example, developed a logical and
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consistent domestic tax policy framework essentially on the assumption that Canada was
a closed economy and then treated the international dimension as something that could be
‘fixed up’ along the lines just sketched once Canada got its domestic tax system ‘right.’
This approach did not work well then. It certainly does not work now. Given the
importance of international developments to Canada and the erosion of technological and
physical impediments to cross-border economic flows, the distinctions between home and
foreign (or onshore and offshore) established by the traditional paradigm do not provide
clear guidelines in dealing with the ‘new’ international fiscal economy. International
concerns can no longer be relegated to a secondary ‘add-on’ role in formulating tax
policy in economies open to extensive trans-border flows.
The New Context – Seamless Interaction
Over the last few decades, many business operations have changed drastically in the
direction of dispersing production, with different though nevertheless integrated
operations taking place – in reality or at least on paper -- in different countries. The share
of total value-added – the ultimate tax base -- arising from services and intangibles has
increased and made it more difficult to locate the source of corporate income or taxable
activities sufficiently clearly in space (or time) for any country to tax that income with a
demonstrably superior relative claim than other countries involved. For similar reasons,
although to a considerably lesser degree, it has also become somewhat harder to tax
personal income both because it is easier for individuals to earn income outside of their
country of residence and because traditional employer-employee relationships have
increasingly been evolving into independent contractor status, with more and more
‘owner-managers’ being able to convert labour income relatively simply into capital
income.
At the same time, the challenges posed by electronic commerce and more generally the
ability to transfer information, money and even the performance of tasks invisibly
without an apparent necessary presence anywhere -- including where the output is
consumed -- have made it more difficult for consumption taxes to compensate for the
declining reliability of the income tax base. Sellers can increase sales without having a
physical presence in a country, and the increased importance of digitized products makes
collecting taxes more difficult.
None of these factors – except to some extent with respect to the taxation of international
corporate income -- as yet constitutes a proven ‘tax killer.’ Taken together, however, it
seems likely that countries in the 21st century must design and implement tax policy very
much in an international context. This section explores some of the ways in which this
new international world may affect what countries can do to achieve national policy
objectives through tax policy.
2.1

The Internationalization of Tax Policy and Administration

National tax systems are confronting each other in unprecedented ways as the economies
they support increasingly engage with each other. What has not changed, however, is
that each country has its own tax system intended in part to frame, fund and achieve
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national social, political and economic goals. Good tax policy cannot be divorced from
the underlying social, political and economic goals that motivate it. Nations do not
necessarily share common goals, and their different choices to some extent manifest
themselves in tax system choices. Nonetheless, the interactions of different economies
and fiscal systems create a certain degree of unavoidable mutual dependence.
The increasingly pervasive international aspect of tax policy may surface directly in
response to other countries’ choices: as early as the 1970s, for instance, Canada
introduced a new system of accelerated depreciation for manufacturing and processing in
part as a response to a tax export subsidy established by the United States. More
recently, many countries have engaged in competitive downward moves of corporate
income tax rates. Reflecting this, much recent discussion of international tax policy
reform has been driven by the interests of multinational and global business enterprises in
synthesizing a competitive effective international tax rate. Although these enterprises
exist as constellations of separate accounting entities, they are economic units that are
constantly, through various intra-firm dealings, re-establishing their economic unity in
relation to similarly placed enterprises. The transfer pricing issue in tax policy is
concerned with detecting when such dealings cross justifiable economic limits and in
effect become devices to redefine and shift “profits” to where tax is least. Since there is
no international tax system as such, in effect the artificial subdivision of economic units
into legally separate accounting units results in a process of fiscal self-help as economic
actors mix and match elements of the different tax systems facing them until their tax
cost of doing business is comparable (or lower) than that of their competitors.
From a tax rather than business perspective, ‘internationalization’ in various guises may
emerge from the adoption of such tax policy norms as the CEN and CIN approaches
mentioned earlier, or most explicitly – and collaboratively -- through bargained
accommodations by way of tax, trade and other treaties. The main playing ground
currently is how to measure and tax international business income earned indirectly
through foreign legal constructions – foreign affiliates or more generally controlled
foreign corporations. Whether and how taxation of such income should be deferred and
any foreign tax recognized, is far from a decided issue. The CEN approach is to apply
the home tax system without regard for where the income is earned, crediting foreign tax
up to the home (residence) country tax liability. The CIN approach is to give primacy to
source country taxation by exempting such income from residence country taxation, on
the grounds that doing so is in the residence country’s ultimate economic interest. Both
approaches focus on the effective income tax rate and assume both that domestic and
foreign income measures are appropriate and that all relevant expenses are appropriately
aligned with domestic and foreign revenues respectively.
When national economies are relatively autonomous, countries have considerable latitude
in pursuing their own distinct policies. The quite different notions of competition
embedded in CEN and CIN are not a big issue when the elasticity of capital flows to
effective tax rates is relatively low. However, as the economic context becomes more
open and “soft” production inputs (e.g. various manifestations of money or finance and
such intangibles as know-how, knowledge, experience and the like) become more
important, matters change. The need to accommodate each country’s tax system to the
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different systems elsewhere becomes unavoidable. Tax policy options and tax
administration techniques formerly considered unthinkable may have to be reconsidered.
For example, reliance on income taxation as the primary revenue source becomes more
questionable when it becomes increasingly difficult to define what income is and where it
is earned. In such circumstances, more reliance may have to be placed on taxes based on
more directly observable and measurable bases such as consumption, payrolls, and
property.
As already noted, such problems are most noticeable with respect to international
business income. The commonly accepted arm’s length standard for measuring and
allocating among taxing jurisdictions the international income of business enterprises is
intended to provide a basis for national taxation of the “correct” share of such income. To
do so, however, this approach in effect applies traditional conventions based on separate
entity accounting to multinational and global corporations that consolidate commercial
activities organized and operated along functional lines according to centres of business
interest. Applying the traditional paradigm assuming economic units that can
meaningfully be divided into legally separate components for tax, management
accounting or other purposes flies in the face of reality. Multinational enterprises exist
precisely to avoid the costs and limitations of dealings between unrelated parties. The
“economic rent” such firms obtain by operating as a economic entity that avoids these
costs and limitations cannot be properly captured and allocated by the prevalent tax
approach. National tax administrations need effective institutional ways to tax such
enterprises, but characterizing them in a manner that directly contradicts their essence
and manner of operation does not seem to be a promising path to sustainable tax policy.
Indeed, the effort to make such an approach workable may result in its becoming so
reliant on a series of fictional assumptions – conceived initially as practical expedients to
adjust for possible profit distortions attributable to common control -- that over time the
inherent weakness of this approach becomes magnified and compounded to the point that
it becomes unworkable and unadministrable.25
One answer to this problem may, as already suggested, be a fundamental reweighting of
national tax policy leading to a reduced emphasis on income taxes that to some degree
have already become for many enterprises almost discretionary in their impact and
unpredictable in terms of revenue. A quite different approach, however, is to focus on
the practical regulatory dimension of the emerging new world economic and tax policy
order. The seeds of such an international approach to tax regulation may be found in
various more or less formal interactions of tax policy and regulatory authorities such as
the OECD’s Global Tax Forum and various associations of tax administrators such as the
Forum on Tax Administration, the Joint International Tax Shelter Information Centre, the
OECE’s Global Tax Forum and the Leeds Castle Group,26 as well as in a plethora of new
25

The OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines started out as devices to provide valuation guidance in
identifying when and to what extent there were distortions in the distribution of “profit” within a group
attributable to the possibilities for manipulation engendered by common control. It is far from clear that the
application of these guidelines as transactional accounting standards is or can be adequately matched by the
legal concepts and tax system features necessary to give them life.
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The OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) is a Paris-based group of (now)
34 countries, most of which are relatively high-income countries. The Forum of Tax Administrators (FTA)
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ways of formalizing the exchange of information among tax authorities. Countries have
increasingly been sharing financial and tax information, through a plethora of Tax
Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) in addition to information exchange
arrangements contained in bilateral tax treaties. In principle such agreements are
intended to limit the possibility that income can be hidden from interested tax authorities;
in practice, however, success in this respect remains elusive. One way or another,
however, both tax administrators and tax policy makers are becoming increasingly well
informed about and influenced by developments and approaches in other countries.
Tax policy has always been to some extent a ‘best practices’ approach. However, the
past is not the future. Those concerned with the design and implementation of tax
systems need to look ahead and consider carefully whether the policy and administrative
mix that best achieves the underlying public policy objectives of taxation should change
and, if so, how it should change. The balance of this section explores the extent to which
the increased internationalization of taxation suggests that it may be necessary to abandon
some historically accepted best practices and to adopt new ones.
2.2

Evaluation Criteria: The Framework for Identifying and Measuring
Objectives

Even if a country gets the economic analysis of its tax system right, so long as national
legal and tax systems do not align questions arise about how tax policy can be effectively
implemented. Legal infrastructure can be critical in determining policy outcomes in
practice. Essentially, four important questions must be decided in order to implement
any tax policy: What? Who? How? When? Unless the answers to these questions are
clear and appropriate, and both captured by and enforceable within a country’s legal
system and tax regime, the effectiveness with which even the most intuitively sound and
thoroughly conceived tax policy can achieve its intended objectives may be questionable.
What – the Taxable Object
To be captured by the tax system, the tax base – the economic value that is subject to tax
-- must be both identifiable and clearly defined either through specific rules or in a
relevant general law that supplies the definition and is sufficient within existing legal
conventions and practices. This task can be very complicated in an international context.
Many legal (and tax) systems treat such definitional issues quite differently. The
interaction of national tax systems requires some measure of mutual recognition of these
definitions if the results are not to be either ineffective or distortionary. For example,
recent OECD attempts to revise the Transfer Pricing Guidelines to deal with such issues
as business restructuring and intangibles like “intellectual property” are critical in order
to get at the inherent synergies and efficiencies that are the hallmarks of multinational
and global business enterprises. However, the fact is that there is no common
is a panel of national tax administrators established in 2002 by the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs to
promote dialogue between administrations. The Leeds Castle Group is a group of tax administrators from a
number of major countries, including some non-OECD countries like China and India, who meet regularly
to discuss mutual compliance problems. The Joint International Tax Shelter Center was established by the
U.S., U.K., Canada and Australia to develop and share information on abusive tax avoidance.
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international understanding of what exactly constitutes an “intangible.” Even the bestdefined economic conceptualization does not fit easily within existing national legal and
tax systems. This is a much more important challenge to developing a coherent and
effective international tax policy than is usually recognized: in the absence of an agreed
legal formulation, getting the economics right is like thinking important thoughts without
having either the facility of language to express them or the linguistic conventions
necessary to translate from one language to another.
Who – the Taxable Subject
Even assuming that the object of taxation can be captured satisfactorily by the tax law,
that object must then be associated with a particular economic actor whom the tax system
recognizes and holds accountable and from whom the tax can be readily collected. Since
the norms of public international law generally prohibit extra-territorial enforcement of
tax laws, the enforcement by any country of even the most well-designed ‘international’
tax system inevitably stops at the national border. This is a major problem in the ‘world
without (economic) borders’ that has to some extent developed in recent decades. One
result has been to put pressure on commonly accepted conventions for defining the
characteristics of a “taxable person”, particularly with respect to taxing corporations. As
noted earlier, a corporation is essentially a legal fiction: although corporations are the
focus of much commercial activity and play an important economic and fiscal role, they
actually have no intrinsic economic ‘being’ or even legal personality separate from their
economic owners apart from that bestowed by law. Indeed, as was also mentioned earlier,
corporations – even if there was international agreement on the characteristics of this
business form27 -- as such cannot really pay taxes in the sense of bearing their final
incidence. To determine who really pays taxes imposed on corporations one must in
effect look through the corporation to the natural persons who gain or lose when taxes are
collected at the corporate level, and, as discussed in Section 1, we know very little about
the real incidence of the corporate income tax.
Much the same is true with respect to trusts, which are in legal terms simply an obligation
undertaken by one person (a trustee) to another (a beneficiary) at the instance of a former
owner of property (a settlor) in relation to property and its derivative income (the trust
corpus) intended to be deployed as originally determined by the settlor but according to
the discretion of the trustee in order to serve the material interests of the beneficiary. In
other words, a trust is a special form of relationship among persons. Canadian tax law
gives a trust the legal personality it otherwise lacks separate from its constituent interests,
in order to establish a reference point – a taxpayer – and to capture within the tax system
changes in the value of and income from the settled property. However, even within a
country, it can be difficult to deal with focus points for value that lack both personality
27

One of the many challenges when legal and tax systems interact is the incompatibility of notions as
fundamental as the definition of the taxable unit. A corporation in one country may be considered a
partnership or branch elsewhere; such differences have fundamental implications – for instance that some
“transactions” in one country may not be recognized as such in the other. Tax policy that does not take
such matters into account is deficient. For example, the most recent changes to the Canada-United States
Income Tax Convention, in its Fifth Protocol (Articles IV (6), (7), limits relief otherwise provided by the
treaty when a “resident” of one of the treaty partners is disregarded in the other.
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and a clear connection of a person to a place and of both to a property, as Canada’s recent
experience with ‘income trusts’ demonstrated.
From one perspective, the enforced integration of the taxation of business income that
was in effect achieved through income trusts (where the income earned by the entity was
‘flowed through’ the trust and taxed only in the hands of its beneficial owners) in effect
yielded a simple (and some might say just as well as efficient) result by treating business
income roughly equivalently regardless of the legal construction – corporation, trust or
partnership – within which the income is captured and from which it is allocated or
distributed to its economic owners. From another perspective, however, real tax
avoidance opportunities may arise from imperfect attributions of “personality” in such
arrangements – in this case in terms of establishing precisely who the taxable actor is
with respect to the taxable object (the trust property). Tax policy analysis does not stop
with the immediate trust actor but must also foresee how the presumed owners of the
income are treated in relation to the flowed through income. For example, to the extent
that the income belongs to tax-exempt persons, such as certain deferred income plans, the
result may be what from a policy perspective may be considered an intolerable delay in
taxing the income despite the theoretical attractiveness, from one perspective, of
integrating the income “earner” and “owner”.28 Whether such arrangements constitute
tax avoidance and whether such avoidance is to be corrected depends largely on the
objective expectations for taxing such value and the rationale for such expectations. It is
by no means easy to determine the answer to such fundamental questions even within a
purely national context, let alone in the much less well determined international context.
How – The Taxable Transmission of Value
Even when the taxable object is identified as well as a taxable actor to be held
accountable the manner in which the value – the object – is manipulated may matter.
Typically, the law recognizes a change in the relative interests of actors in a taxable
object when there is a disposition (sale or other transfer or letting for use) of the object or
the performance of some sort of service. It is this act that gives rise to an identifiable and
measurable income or other outcome that in turn occasions tax. In the international
arena, however, there is often no common understanding among countries, especially
when the taxable object is ill defined or can bear more than one characterization, as to
who can be held accountable for its manipulation or even when such an activity takes
place.
When – Timing Matters
The best theoretical tax policy construct is not much use if no tax can be collected or if
the limits of tax avoidance cannot be determined and addressed in an objectively
definable and enforceable way within a reasonable period of time. When is a transmission
28

The collision of these tax policy considerations, in this case, led in Canada to the adoption of a corporate
tax model, with two primary features: the introduction of yet another entity concept – the “specified
investment flow-through” (“SIFT”) trust – as well as rules to assimilate public investment trusts and
partnerships to corporations and the refinement of the dividend tax credit for distributions on corporate
shares to ensure better integration of corporate and shareholder taxation.
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of value a taxable event, and with what other taxable events should it be associated in
order to ensure that the tax base accords with internally consistent tax policy principles
formulated and applied with the unique demands of internationalization in mind?
A topical example of this problem that countries are now rethinking the alignment of
financing charges (interest) and the income earning activities that are directly or
indirectly financed. This problem, sometimes described as (or associated with) “debt
dumping,” is being addressed by different countries in different ways, most of which are
related to the thin capitalization rules that exist in many tax systems. These rules are
intended to police excessive income transfers arising from debt service that has been
arranged to benefit entities beyond the jurisdiction of the country within which a
particular entity is located. Although the issue of limiting interest deductibility has
sometimes been approached as a domestic tax shelter issue, it is generally driven by a
fundamental international question, namely the extent to which a country’s tax system is
prepared to cede tax base in favour of another country to which the affected tax subject
and/or tax object, and related income, has a connection. How much recognition of
foreign taxes whether by credit, exclusion of income (and implicitly tax which amounts
to a full foreign tax credit) or otherwise, is justifiable, and why? If financing expenses
are recognized in relation to a source of income to which they do not really relate, then
foreign income will be overstated. Even if the tax rules of the country in question
attribute the financing charge to the foreign underlying income, the final outcome of the
national disallowance of a financing charge is unclear since that outcome depends on
how both the foreign country and the multinational firm react. Once international
considerations are introduced, tax policy becomes enormously more complex because it
must consider not only potential taxpayer reactions but also those of other taxing
jurisdictions.
Defining the Tax Base – Necessary Accommodations
This brief discussion of four of the key building blocks of any income tax system
illustrates some of the ways in which why international developments may force some
rethinking of tax policy conventions. The underlying theme is that there are increasingly
practical as well as theoretical limitations to the usual guidelines of taxation set out in
Section 1. No country is likely simply to abandon its tax claims in favour of the interests
of another country when it comes to taxpayers having some recognizable connection to
both unless there is a significant reason to do so in its own interests. Indeed, it is this axis
of interest – country to country acting as if they were economic actors in relation to each
other through their respective taxpayers – that accounts for the internationalization of tax
policy and rules, and gives rise to the complex administrative web manifest in tax
treaties, information sharing, transfer pricing agreements among taxpayers and tax
administrations, and the like. However, it is hard to discern very clear thinking about the
objectives of international tax policy in the way international taxation currently works.
Provisions such as those on controlled foreign corporations and foreign tax credits found
in national tax laws, like the many tax treaties that now exist, are perhaps best considered
as pragmatic attempts to accommodate the many physical and legal ways in which
commercial activities actually take place by adding on particular features to tax laws
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developed essentially for domestic purposes, without focusing on how the new
international aspects interact with and may fundamentally alter the achievement of the
various domestic tax policy objectives. This is changing. More fundamental questions
are being asked about how tax systems sit atop the legal system that gives them definition
– notions of property, contractual dealing, transfer events – and how the changing roles of
members of a multinational or global enterprise leads to ‘transmission’ elsewhere of the
economic value thought to originate in a country.
Although agreed answers are hard to find, taxpayers and their various governments have
in effect been communicating with each other both through language and through
commercial relations. Conceptually, it may even be possible to imply or infer the
implicit evolution of a sort of loose confederation of a number of more developed
national tax systems perhaps not all that different in some respects from the more formal
arrangements that exist within federal countries such as Canada to co-ordinate the
contemporaneous application of the federal and provincial tax systems on similar income
and consumption bases. We develop this thought further in Section 3 below. Equally,
however, what current international tax rules and practices illustrate may be less a
principled justification for their continuing acceptance and use than a last ditch
rationalization for clinging to outmoded practices and constraints. Time will tell.
In any case, as noted earlier, it seems clear that many productive inputs (including skilled
people) are more mobile and less connected to particular countries than ever before.
Nations, through their tax systems, are hence increasingly competing for the potential tax
base generated by such inputs. In the search for revenues, as borders are less and less the
prime determinant of where the fruits of economic activity or necessary capital reside, tax
systems may need to utilize whatever connections or ties to the potential tax base they
can assert.
From a more positive perspective, one might perhaps argue that there is now in effect a
larger shared interest among competing tax systems and, correspondingly, heightened
awareness and responsiveness in each country to the economic and tax policy
characteristics of other tax systems. In other words, tax policy objectives associated with
such hitherto theoretical concepts as inter-nation equity (‘fair’ international sharing
arrangements) have arguably become more important. This line of thinking points in the
direction of the need for more explicit agreements among jurisdictions as to who should
tax what and how much -- if only to ensure that anyone is to be able to tax much in any
fashion.
At the same time, however, the increased importance of cross-border tax bases moves
administrability issues to the forefront. Even the best-designed international (or, for that
matter national) tax will not work if it cannot be reliably collected -- for instance, because
some key parameters are porous or indefinite, or because it is simply too complex to
expect adequate compliance even from diligent and honest self-enforcers or adequate
enforcement from even the best tax officials.
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Rethinking the Parameters of Tax Policy

One way or another, the message seems clear: a relatively open economy cannot conceive
its tax regime in isolation. It must increasingly do so in relation to the tax regimes in
place (or expected) in other jurisdictions. International tax policy may perhaps best be
thought of as domestic tax policy adjusted to accommodate adequately the nature and
transmission of high-value economic inputs (factors of production) as well as outputs
across borders, in a world in which most economies are relatively open and have, to some
extent, dynamic influences on each other. Accordingly, to be both sound and sustainable
domestic tax policy must attempt to foresee critical developments abroad and
accommodate them in its own interest. One aspect of this concern relates to identifying
elements of interconnected international policy behaviour that may impair otherwise
desirable international economic integration. Importantly, however, another important
aspect is to weigh such underlying public policy objectives as preserving the federation
and domestic self-interest (national welfare, as the economic literature often calls it)
carefully and explicitly in relation to tax policy choices that some may suggest are
required in the interests of international tax policy compatibility and more successful
integration with the international economy.
Much of the current international tax regime, from the League of Nations in the 1920s to
the World Trade Organization in the 1990s, derived from decades of effort to reduce both
the distortionary effects of multiple trade taxes and the use of such taxes to shape, colour
and subsidize trade – efforts that continue to this day as witnessed by the OECD’s
continuing efforts to establish a common international basis for taxing digital services.
The sorts of questions debated by League of Nations experts in the 1920s, like the
language of that debate, are eerily similar to present international tax policy debates.
Similar efforts are underway at various international and cross-national levels to grapple
with the even more difficult (and considerably broader) problems that arise from the
increasingly large share of income arising from such ‘footloose’ factors as intangibles
and financial structuring.
Practical tax policy and tax administration is necessarily driven by the observable
characteristics of economic systems, legal systems and business constructs on the basis of
which potentially taxable tax bases can be identified and measured. The basic problem is
that many of the key constructs on which current tax systems rely are essentially fictional
-- such as corporations and various self-selected outcomes (for example, through
elections (optional choices) to characterize a particular activity or tax actor in a particular
way). The fictional underpinnings of fiscal outcomes become accentuated as economic
systems and business constructs more and more reflect the significance of such intangible
inputs as organizational and knowledge-based intangibles that may not even be forms of
legally protected property. In some instances the functioning of the tax system may
depend not only on the relevant actors (firms and tax administrations alike) using
accepted legal norms but also on concepts and procedures that either do not have a
normative analogue or may simply be made up to suit the immediate needs of tax
regulation. For example, much contemporary international transfer pricing now works
more or less like this. Such fictions may be useful, even necessary, to make the system
work at all. However, as they accumulate over time the system as a whole may become

Designing Tax Policy: Constraints and Objectives in an Open Economy

less coherent as the fictions are increasingly tested by circumstances with which they
were not meant to contend. The present patchwork of administrative devices and
practices may have become so intrinsic to orderly tax administration that by default it has
become “the system.” National tax systems that rest on such shaky foundations cannot
be reliably or compatibly co-ordinated with the equally shaky systems of other countries.
Ideally, the parameters of a tax system need to be capable of being grounded in a legal
system in a cogent and understandable way as well as in a way that reflects a measure of
predictable symmetry with the reactions of other countries.
In the international context, for example, it may be that the first step towards designing a
coherent and practical tax framework is to reverse the current situation and to
acknowledge that the focus should be on the source of economic contributions rather than
the residence of persons and entities who may or may not be responsible for those
contributions in ways that can be distorted through convenient manipulation or
movement of responsibility for activity. If the objective is to capture within the tax base
activities that have a measurable and observable connection to a country in such a way
that the economic actors held accountable to pay the tax do so within the framework of
the parameters of equity, efficiency and administrability discussed in Section 1, then
almost certainly the tax system should focus primarily on activities that are clearly
economically connected to the country. This focus limits the extent to which either the
tax base or the mode of taxation can be manipulated by those outside the domestic
economy (and polity) who neither fully benefit from the tax-financed economic, social
and political infrastructure nor can be held fully accountable to contribute to it -- nonresidents, to use the typical terminology, whose interests and responsibilities are not the
same those of ‘full tax citizens.’
One strand of recent attempts to cope with the growth of mobile intangible factors has
been an international push to homogenize tax systems in part through administrative
determinations and guidance exercised by way of a kind of informal international tax
administration among major countries. Such efforts may be helpful in terms of aligning
tax regulation with the characteristics of the economic actors affected by taxes and the
economic context in which they operate. On the other hand, such moves also imply that
countries are silently relinquishing some control over the objectives and characteristics of
their tax (and economic) systems. This basic problem is buried in the context of the
many specific questions that many countries are now trying to deal with in the
international context. For example, although tax discrimination between residents and
non-residents is foresworn in tax treaties, countries usually find their way around this
prescription through tax expenditures and similar indirect routes as well as by drawing
the boundaries of “discrimination” in treaties so that the use of the tax system to attain
policy based fiscal and economic objectives is not forbidden because it is not
“discrimination.” Such considerations suggest that it is perhaps time to think through
more explicitly how the international and national dimensions of tax policy design and
administration may be better balanced within a broader policy context.
A related issue is the extent to which dominant economic actors may be able to organize
or systematize their interactions with national tax systems, through, for example,
advanced pricing arrangements/agreements (APAs), which are in effect pre-agreed
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transfer pricing arrangements. Unless considerable care is used in defining and
establishing taxation parameters in such agreements, the achievement of more
fundamental tax policy objectives may be imperilled. In general, clinging to such wellentrenched rules as the arm’s length paradigm for measuring the international allocation
of multinational income earned through highly integrated activity that increasingly
depends on elements not uniquely associated with any particular place presses the limits
of self-interested but interdependent national tax policies. As emphasized earlier,
multinationals exist essentially because they can increase their returns by obviating the
constraints of arm’s length dealing; defining their activities for tax purposes by separate
entity financial accounting simply cannot capture their integrated and consolidated
operations in any sensible way. The more outcomes depend on fictions antithetical to the
economic notions and actors to which they apply, the more unreliable, political and
disputatious international taxation become because there can be no reliable reference
point to resolve disputes on a predictable basis.
All of these considerations connect to tax administration. What are the norms of
acceptable tax compliance?
One country’s avoidance may be another’s fiscal
enrichment. In some instances, clever international tax planning may even result in an
absolute diminution in the tax base, creating a sort of ‘super’ private return to those who
best play the game of tax planning devices, holding companies, tax-preferred
jurisdictions etc. To put the problem another way, what is ‘excessive’ tax avoidance, that
is, when does legal tax planning go beyond the pale by bypassing domestic norms and
escaping the limits of the tax system completely?
Although it may seem paradoxical, in some instances it may make policy sense in terms
of achieving more important economic and political objectives for a country to relinquish
reliance on traditional constraints on avoidance. This is more or less how nations
originally approached the issue of international tax policy in the early twentieth century
when the League of Nations tried to relieve gratuitous tax-induced impediments to trade
by tackling the nature and significance of international taxation. The modern child of
these parents is the notion of tax-base sharing through treaties, seen as fiscal and
economic bargains between countries each of which is acting in its own national self
interest, as well as the less formal emerging international tax administration arrangements
mentioned above. In the modern context, however, with the substantially increased
‘international’ dimension of the tax base, the question becomes whether any tax policy
choices are really ‘domestic’ if in the end they must be compatible with different choices
made by other countries with which the ‘domestic’ tax system is joined by force of
circumstances. Who really controls the tax base?

3.

The Next Generation of Tax Policy Objectives

Reconsidering Basic Tax Policy Questions
Section 1 discussed several tax policy objectives and design criteria. For the most part,
that discussion implicitly proceeded as though countries could decide how to tax in
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complete autonomy. As discussed in Section 2, however, in the modern world this
assumption is increasingly being tested. Some basic questions about tax policy need to
be reconsidered in this context, particularly with respect to the taxation of international
business and capital income but also, more generally, with respect to such broad-based
taxes as GST and income taxes.


What is the tax base? In a more open economy should more attention be paid to
consumption-based than income based taxes? The present income tax in Canada,
for example, is to a considerable extent already really a consumption-based tax
through its treatment of both pensions and housing: should the current ‘hybrid’
income tax system shift even further towards a more explicit consumption-tax
base? If it were to be shifted, how should the regressive elements of consumption
based taxation be addressed in order to satisfy the fairness concerns discussed in
Section 1?



Why should some or all the tax base potentially associated with foreign
operations of domestic business be freed from tax? At present, for example,
unless repatriated most earnings of Canadian firms operating abroad are not taxed
in Canada. If the expectation is that the result of this policy is compounded
economic returns for the country that exceed the present value of this tax cost,
how can this be tested and measured? Can policy-makers distinguish
meaningfully between facilitating international competition in terms of the
interests of private parties and doing so for national economic interests? If they
cannot do so, then what should they do?



When (political) geography ceases to align with (economic) reality, do current
approaches to the international aspects of tax policy design and administration
provide an adequate or appropriate way to deal with this issue? Tax systems to
some extent have always competed with each other for shares of a shared tax
base; they do so today more than ever. When countries’ interests collide,
historically solutions have been reached either through conflict or, in one form or
another, through cooperation. To the extent that consumption and production have
less and less attachment to political geography so that the funding of public
expenditure depends to a significant extent on factors outside political borders, the
integrity and sustainability of the political state is inevitably affected to some
extent. Few issues are more important in determining tax policy today than
deciding how to cope with the international environment. The relative weights to
be attached to the traditional equity, efficiency, and administrative (simplicity,
feasibility) aspects of international tax policy need to be reconsidered in this
context.

The Limits of Government Intervention
Standard public finance theory identifies three aspects of government intervention in the
economy – stabilization, distribution and allocation. The first two of these objectives are
usually associated with central government policy while to a considerable extent the last,
allocation, is the task of subnational governments. Arguably, however, when forces
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exogenous to the nation may, as the recent financial crisis shows, effectively override
national control over stabilization and distribution to a considerable extent then in many
ways the main role left to the central government too becomes the allocation function. In
these circumstances, the highest order of “government” in effect becomes little more than
a sort of overarching supranational congeries of loose economic and legal arrangements
that rely entirely on ‘market forces’ (including ‘political markets’) for enforcement
purposes. National tax systems to some extent become more like subnational tax systems
when the world in which they operate is such that national tax policy outcomes are
shaped in part both by international commercial arrangements and by various types of
formal and informal regulatory collaboration among tax authorities (as well as specific
accommodations in treaties and other legal arrangements). If so, there may perhaps be
some lessons for national tax policy to be learned from how subnational tax systems
work.
Multilevel Taxation
One principle of taxation in a multilevel system is that, to the extent possible, each level
of government should limit the exercise of its taxing authority to what it can do. In effect
this is a modified version of the benefit principle that contemplates some measure of
correspondence between taxes levied and the benefits garnered by those paying the taxes.
Taxes with broader societal objectives, intended either to define the major parameters of
the social system or to redistribute resources within it, do not fit easily within this
paradigm. For this reason, stabilization and redistribution seldom rank high as objectives
of subnational tax policy both because such general taxes have effects and purposes that
transcend an immediate connection to their payers and because in open subnational
economies it is difficult to impose and administer those taxes in an equitable and efficient
way. In most countries, the gap between those expenditures that can and should be
efficiently carried out at the subnational level and those taxes that can be effectively,
efficiently, and equitably administered at that level is closed through government-togovernment accommodations akin to the federal provincial revenue and transfer
agreements in Canada.
In addition to such transfers and revenue-sharing arrangements, in a closed system like
the Canadian federation in which several levels of taxation co-exist, generally within well
defined and controllable boundaries, questions about revenue losses and other problems
that might arise from imperfect interactions between levels of taxation or as a result of
transaction or other manipulations by taxpayers can be addressed. However, none of this
is true when, as sketched above, the central “authority” to which a country is to some
extent subordinated actually exercises no real international tax authority, with the result
that taxpayers can sometimes manipulate imperfections in the characteristics and
interactions of tax systems in such a way as to reduce the aggregate international tax
base.
National Tax Policy Is Not National
While it would clearly be wrong to exaggerate the extent to which national fiscal
autonomy has as yet been neutered in this way, it nonetheless seems prudent to consider
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how more principled tax policy responses to the international pressures sketched in
Section 2 might be developed. The traditional tax policy criteria of equity, efficiency,
administrability and their derivatives set out in Section 1 may be imperfect and
incomplete. Nonetheless, they still provide a useful framework within which to balance
these factors more explicitly even within an open economy framework. The traditional
paradigm, such as it is, need not be replaced. In fact, the specific features of tax policy
oriented to subnational governments reflect refined applications of the traditional
paradigm, and one way to begin the task of rethinking the traditional tax policy paradigm
may be to consider more carefully the conventional discussion of the appropriate tax
instruments for subnational jurisdictions.
Four criteria may be suggested to guide the design of subnational taxes:29
(i)

The first, derived clearly from the efficiency criterion, is that
subnational taxes should not distort resource allocation (unless, of
course, there are clear and significant net gains in terms of nonfiscal policy objectives from doing so).

(ii)

The second criterion is accountability in the sense that subnational
taxes should be both politically transparent and visible in order to
ensure that the governments imposing such taxes are clearly
accountable to those for whom they are supposedly acting – their
residents. Both these criteria are of course satisfied if taxes are
imposed in accordance with the benefit principle so that those who
benefit (from the public services financed), those who pay (in
terms of the final incidence of the taxes), and those who ultimately
‘decide’ on taxes are responsible and accountable to the same set
of people.

(iii)

Third, and even more ideally given the heterogeneous nature of
most countries, subnational taxes should be adequate and sufficient
to finance expenditure needs (at least of the richest subnational
jurisdictions).30

(iv)

Finally, in order to be effectively implemented, subnational taxes
should have relatively immobile bases in the sense that the
responsiveness of the tax base to rate changes (its rate elasticity) is
low and the tax is visibly based on property and personal interests
that are clearly related to, and preferably clearly observable in, the
tax jurisdiction in question.

These parameters are not as strict as they may seem at first glance. They do not, for
instance, imply that subnational jurisdictions can or should tax only real estate. In fact, as
Canadian experience shows, it is possible for provinces – and conceivably even localities
29

For a recent review of the relevant literature (in the context of developing countries), see Bird (2011).
Countries may, or may not, choose to ‘rebalance’ subnational finances by establishing, as Canada has
done, some ‘equalization’ system of fiscal transfers to those regions with fewer fiscal resources.
30
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– to tax such mobile bases such as employment and consumption provided adequate
‘supra-jurisdictional’ administrative institutions are developed, as in the extensive
federal-provincial tax agreements found in Canada as well as such commonly-agreed
federal-provincial rules as those on profit allocation. Nor do the points listed above
suggest that it is either impossible or undesirable to attempt to exercise flexible authority
over the nature and degree of taxation – for example, to achieve redistribution or targeted
incentive effects through taxation. They do suggest, however, that the limits on such
measures are much tighter at the subnational level and the likely effectiveness of such
measures limited.
On the whole the general lesson suggested by considering subnational taxation is that in
an open economy the tax system is likely to work best if the demands put on the tax
authority for revenue do not exceed its feasible grasp – for instance by trying to extend its
authority to sources and persons (non-residents) beyond its reach. Globalization need not
result in the dread ‘race to the bottom’ for the national public sectors, just as
‘provincialization’ has not noticeably hampered the development of the Canadian public
sector at either the federal or provincial levels, let alone in total. However, in the
international context – which differs sharply from the national context owing to the
absence of any overarching fiscal authority -- the result is likely to be that it will become
increasingly difficult to resolve policy problems simply by expanding public expenditures
(or ‘tax expenditures’) and expecting the tax system to be able to keep up.
Looking Forward
In short, the next generation of tax policy changes in Canada and other countries heavily
dependent on international developments will likely have to take more explicitly into
account the limitations on national fiscal autonomy imposed by a shrinking economic
world. When the traditional closed economy analytical box no longer adequately
encompasses the critical marginal (international) component of the tax base tax policy
choices will increasingly have to be framed outside that box. In recognition of this fact,
Canada and other countries have in practice begun to delegate more and more elements of
national tax authority to such informal internationally-dominated arenas as informal
associations of tax administrators and policy makers. This is not a prescription; it is
already reality, and likely to become even more so in the future. In the circumstances,
perhaps the most important policy concern for those charged with shaping and
implementing future tax policy should be to work towards more transparent and balanced
processes to shape the international tax policy decisions that impact on and to some
extent limit national tax policy autonomy.
Getting the right solutions from a domestic policy perspective with respect to such
esoteric issues as controlled foreign companies, transfer pricing, thin capitalisation and
the like is far too important for the development of coherent, feasible, and necessary
domestic tax policy to be left to occasional informal chats in Paris or elsewhere. As with
domestic tax policy, the ‘right’ results from a national perspective are only likely to
emerge when the ‘right’ decision process is in place. It remains to be seen, however,
whether that process will eventually lead to some form of ‘international tax organization’
or whether, as the experience of the European Union – which already faces all the
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problems discussed here in a particularly clear fashion – suggests, it may perhaps prove
to be both more feasible and more probable that countries will not take pre-emptive
action to ‘get it right’ but will instead wait until solutions of some sort finally seem to
emerge from increasingly formal ‘joint’ policy actions and administrative cooperation
between national administrations. In either case the formulation and implementation of
tax policy in the future seems certain to become even more outward-looking than it
already is. All those concerned with improving tax policy and sustaining the critical
aspects of the existing public sector in open economies should be thinking more carefully
about these matters than perhaps has been the case in the past.
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